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Change in Tunisia and Egypt was sudden and came as a surprise. The 
European Union should now provide pro-active support with the help of a 
transformation partnership. For this purpose it should as soon as possible 
subject the instruments and strategies that it has used hitherto to a tho-
rough revision. Moreover, the EU should open its market for agricultural 
products from North Africa and the Middle East. 
At the beginning of 2011 protest move-
ments in Tunisia and Egypt unexpectedly 
toppled the long-standing regimes of Pres-
ident Ben Ali and President Mubarak. The 
demonstrators on the streets of Tunis, Cai-
ro and Alexandria have fought for and ob-
tained the opportunity to initiate a new po-
litical process in their countries and sent a 
signal to the whole of the Middle East. 
Both countries are now at the start of a dif-
ficult transitional phase. For decades the 
regimes were dominated by the two presi-
dents and their parties. They were a syn-
onym for political stagnation. And they 
have now reached the end of the line. Who 
and what will finally take their place is an 
open question. But there is a distinct pos-
sibility that in the weeks ahead two coun-
tries of the Arab world will set out on the 
path leading to democratization. 
The European Union has offered to help 
and assist Egypt and Tunisia. In addition 
to the political challenges, both countries 
are confronted with economic and social 
problems which will complicate the transi-
tional processes. 
 
With these transformation partnerships in 
North Africa the European Union is enter-
ing on new political territory. Assuming 
that the new political leaderships that are 
beginning to emerge accept the offer, the 
transformation partnerships will provide 
the EU with an opportunity to put its 
largely unsuccessful Mediterranean policy, 
which has been in existence since 1995, 
on a new footing. However, this means 
that the EU actors in Brussels will have to 
develop a clear-cut strategy and coordinate 
the measures they decide to adopt. Fur-
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thermore, the requisite financial resources 
will have to be made available forthwith. 
 
I 
Why have the regimes in 
Egypt and Tunisia col-
lapsed at this juncture? 
The collapse of the regimes and the speed 
with which it happened came as a surprise 
to all observers. It is true, for example, 
that in its Transformation Index the Ber-
telsmann Stiftung has been pointing out 
for years that the democracy rankings for 
North Africa and the Middle East and the 
regional average lag far behind those of 
every other region in the world. And in the 
countries concerned the benefits of eco-
nomic liberalization have not as yet 
reached the majority of the population. 
Since 2002 the Arab Human Development 
Reports of the United Nations have syste-
matically described the deficiencies. The 
regimes were nevertheless deemed to be 
“stable.” However, trouble was brewing 
under the surface.  
“The deficiencies were 
known but the regimes 
were nevertheless deemed 
to be ‘stable’.” 
The countries of North Africa were hit by 
the global economic crisis, which simply 
exacerbated the existing problems. On the 
one hand there was economic distress 
caused by rapidly rising food prices, un-
employment and the lack of a future, espe-
cially among the rapidly increasing 
younger segment of the population; there 
were the decades in which people were 
denied political rights; and there were cor-
rupt governments and persistent and (now 
well documented) human rights abuses. 
On the other hand, there were new forms 
of communication and organization 
through social networks, and better access 
to the media and information. All these 
factors contributed to the civic Arab revo-
lutions which broke out in 2011. 
 
 
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
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II 
How do the political 
upheavals affect the  
European Union and its 
Mediterranean Policy? 
The events in the southern Mediterranean 
affect the EU and its member states far 
more directly than the US. This has once 
again been demonstrated by the refugees 
from North Africa who are currently at-
tempting to reach Europe via the Mediter-
ranean. Cairo and Tunis are only a few 
hours by air from the capitals of the Euro-
pean Union. EU Mediterranean Policy 
means Neighbourhood Policy, and, since 
2004, is at least on paper, one of Europe’s 
foreign policy priorities. However, in the 
last decade the European Union’s attitude 
to the southern Mediterranean area was to 
a large extent determined by security is-
sues. It is true that in 1995 the EU, in its 
Barcelona Process, started out with a wide-
ranging agenda which included political 
dialogue, the economy, democracy, civil 
society and human rights.  
“The EU countries are now 
faced with the task of  
explaining why they were 
unable to distinguish  
between stability and 
stagnation.” 
But the aftermath of 9/11 and the terrorist 
attacks in Europe, the growing migratory 
pressure from the southern Mediterranean 
area, and the conflicts and wars in the 
Middle East led to “securitization,” and 
prompted the EU states to adopt a con-
stricted view of their southern neighbours. 
This went hand in hand with the fact that 
presidential regimes which governed their 
countries with an iron fist (and, seen from 
without, in what for decades seemed to be 
a stable manner) were deemed to be relia-
ble partners in a region that was increa-
singly threatened by instability. The EU 
countries are now faced with the task of 
explaining why they were unable to dis-
tinguish between stability and stagnation. 
The events in North Africa will force the 
EU to fundamentally reform its existing 
instruments. It is true that all important 
cooperation areas are listed in the Neigh-
bourhood Policy documents and in those of 
the Union for the Mediterranean. However, 
there is a lack of focus and there are im-
plementation problems. Most importantly, 
the European Union must attach condi-
tions to its assistance. This is an area 
where the EU clearly needs to do more as 
the transformation partnerships progress. 
Perhaps this may also be an opportunity 
for the Mediterranean Policy, which at the 
moment is not making a great deal of 
headway. 
 
III 
How will the economic 
and social situation of 
people in Egypt and  
Tunisia affect the  
transformation processes? 
Egypt and Tunisia are not only facing a po-
litically difficult transition period, the ex-
act course and duration of which are cur-
rently impossible to predict. Both coun-
tries have in the past witnessed consider-
able deficits in areas such as democratic 
elections, the separation of powers, the in-
dependence of courts, efficient gover-
nance, freedom of assembly, and freedom 
of the press. Furthermore, the political 
transformation process is taking place 
against a background of economic prob-
lems and social tensions, and in recent 
years, largely unnoticed in the West, these 
have led to protests and demonstrations in 
both countries. In recent years both gov-
ernments introduced economic reforms. 
However, the ruling elites have been the 
main beneficiaries of the high growth 
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rates. A relatively high proportion of the 
population continues to live in extreme 
poverty. Illiteracy is declining, but is still 
high among adults. Whilst it is true that 
there is access to education, job opportuni-
ties for a growing number of young people 
are few and far between. Youth unem-
ployment in both countries is significantly 
higher than unemployment among adults. 
Egypt in particular, a country with more 
than 80 million people, is faced with 
enormous challenges on account of its 
(growing) population. In both countries 
transformation will make sense only if it is 
accompanied by economic and social de-
velopment. 
 
IV 
Can the EU play a part in 
the transformation 
processes? 
The European Union can merely offer to 
support the transformation processes. In 
the region people still remember that they 
were once subjected to foreign rule; and 
they have not forgotten the aggressive 
democratization agenda of the George W. 
Bush administration. It is thus right to 
emphasize that the new leaderships and 
people in the region are masters of their 
own destiny. However, it is in the interests 
of the EU to promote a process which will 
lead to the democratization and stabiliza-
tion of its neighbours. For this reason the 
EU should certain-
ly make some at-
tractive offers, 
though these 
should be tied to 
strict conditions. 
Reforms pay off, 
and reneging on 
one’s promises 
can have serious 
consequences. The 
more the EU oper-
ates as a single 
bloc, the greater 
its chances of 
success. This is 
especially true of 
its internal mar-
ket, a sensitive 
issue in the EU when it comes to agricul-
tural products, though for the exporting 
countries in North Africa it is of very great 
interest. In this area the EU has at its dis-
posal a powerful instrument which it can 
make available in order to provide support 
and as a reward. In the area of circular 
migration the EU could offer to facilitate 
temporary access to education and train-
ing. The restrictive approach to visas for 
people from the region has sent out the 
wrong message. Young Europeans can jet 
to North Africa with low-cost carriers, but 
the reverse route is by and large denied to 
people from the area. As far as they are 
concerned, the Mediterranean, which once 
facilitated trade and connected people, is 
now a symbol of division. This does not 
have to stay that way, since the EU and its 
member states can decide to change the 
basic framework. When all is said and 
done, the EU should use tailor-made agen-
das which support the economic develop-
ment of the population as a whole, which 
make a contribution to improving educa-
tional opportunities, and contain pro-
grammes that focus on young people and 
women. In the area of political reforms the 
EU can offer support in the run-up to free 
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elections, and send out election observers. 
It can also make available the services of 
constitutional experts. And Europe’s foun-
dations and NGOs can provide training 
courses for political parties and candi-
dates. Corrupt and inefficient government 
departments must be reformed. The EU 
has quite a lot of experience in this area, 
and can send out advisory missions. How-
ever, the EU should also coordinate its 
measures with those of its member states 
and with other countries and organiza-
tions. Money should not be poured into the 
region indiscriminately as a result of a 
wave of euphoria. For this reason there 
should first of all be a conference on trans-
formation partnerships with Egypt and 
Tunisia which other countries and organi-
zations can attend as observers. 
 
V 
How should the EU deal 
with political Islam? 
In the past European governments have 
tended to adopt a reserved attitude to po-
litical Islam. In the aftermath of 9/11 the 
political discourse tended to focus on its 
radical varieties, even though these are 
merely espoused by a minority. This has 
led to a situation where there are very few 
people in Europe’s capitals who actually 
know any of the Islamist actors who have 
fought for freedom in recent weeks. How-
ever, in future Islamist movements and 
parties are going to play a greater political 
role in both Egypt and Tunisia.  
“Islamists in the region 
have been calling for  
democracy, an end to  
corruption, social  
responsibility and good 
governance.” 
The country reports which are part of the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index show 
that Islamists are frequently the most im-
portant or even the only forces which have 
managed to survive under repressive re-
gimes. Liberal and secular parties were ra-
ther successfully kept in check. Islamists 
in the region have for many years been 
calling for democracy, an end to corrup-
tion, social responsibility and good gover-
nance. For example, in Egypt the Muslim 
Brotherhood has taken on central social 
tasks which the regime either could not or 
did not want to deal with. It is deeply 
rooted in the local community and pos-
sesses not only a certain degree of credi-
bility but also the requisite infrastructure 
in order to care for the social needs of the 
population. It remains to be seen whether 
the moderate or the conservative wing will 
gain the upper hand in Egypt and Tunisia. 
This is yet another reason why the EU 
should become involved. Critics have been 
advocating a dialogue with Islamist 
movements and parties – refusing violence 
- for years. This issue now needs to be put 
on the agenda of the European Union. 
 
VI 
What should the new  
European External Action 
Service do? 
The European External Action Service 
(EEAS) has officially been operational 
since 1 December 2010. However, it is still 
in the establishment phase. Staff from the 
European Commission, the General Secre-
tariat of the Council and the national dip-
lomatic services are still being assembled. 
There are still basic questions about the 
character, the assignment of tasks and the 
financing which can more or less be ex-
plained by the fact that the EEAS is pool-
ing erstwhile responsibilities of the Com-
mission and the Council in the area of for-
eign policy, and that this has led to some 
noisy clashes. The EU delegations in non-
EU countries are also still in the process of 
being restructured. In the past they were 
made up of representatives of the EU 
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Commission, who as yet are still quite 
clearly in the majority. 
 
The political upheavals in North Africa are 
the first test for the EEAS and its head, the 
High Representative Catherine Ashton. 
The EU delegations in Cairo and Tunis, 
and in the other capitals of the Middle 
East and North Africa, need to be re-
organized quickly and indeed with some 
urgency. They will have to be streamlined 
according to the goals of the transforma-
tion partnerships, and the EU Neighbour-
hood Policy. These delegations will now be 
able to showcase the full range of EU poli-
cymaking. The EU should make good use 
of this new instrument. 
 
VII 
How can the European 
Neighbourhood Policy be 
reformed? Should the  
Union for the Mediterra-
nean be abolished? 
In 2004 the European Union enhanced the 
Barcelona Process by adding to it the 
southern dimension of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Whereas the ENP 
tends to favour a bilateral approach, the 
policy initiated in Barcelona–which was 
transformed into the Union for the Medi-
terranean in 2008 –preferred a multilater-
al framework. However, Barcelona and lat-
er the Union for the Mediterranean have 
turned out to be a failure, largely on ac-
count of the gridlock caused by the Middle 
East conflict and the lack of political will 
displayed by the EU member states and 
the partner countries. The Union for the 
Mediterranean is in a political deadlock 
and in its present form ought to be re-
formed. Its interesting features, for exam-
ple, in the area of sustainable energy sup-
plies (Mediterranean Solar Plan) or envi-
ronmental protection could be imple-
mented within the framework of the ENP.  
“The Union for the  
Mediterranean is in a  
political deadlock and in 
its present form ought to 
be reformed.” 
The ENP approach facilitates tailor-made 
policies, and these would have to be 
fleshed out on the basis of the priorities 
defined by the new transformation part-
nerships. Here it will become apparent 
that less is more. As was suggested above, 
the EU should concentrate on significantly 
fewer areas of cooperation, though these 
should be linked to rigorous conditions. 
The Union for the Mediterranean in its 
current form is untenable, and should be 
transformed into a more or less informal 
security forum which can discuss every 
security issue that is of general interest. 
This would yet be an ambitious project and 
only a first step towards a structured se-
curity dialogue in the region, which would 
subsequently have to incorporate the Gulf 
states. 
 
VIII 
What do these regional 
developments signify for 
the Middle East Peace  
Process? 
In 1979 Egypt under President Anwar al-
Sadat made peace with Israel at Camp Da-
vid. Under President Hosni Mubarak the 
country was an important ally of Israel 
and the West, and benefited from military 
and development aid amounting to billions 
of dollars. In the course of the efforts of 
the US and the Middle East Quartet to 
promote the peace process between Israel 
and the Palestinians Egypt under Mubarak 
showed itself willing to cooperate, and also 
attempted to launch initiatives of its own, 
for example by mediating between the 
Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas. In 
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Israel most commentators see the depar-
ture of Mubarak as a threat to the stability 
of Egypt and thus of Israel. Not many 
people are willing to see the new oppor-
tunities presented by the democratization 
of North Africa. In particular many people 
in Israel are worried by the scenarios of a 
lengthy phase of instability, and the pos-
sibility that the Islamist Muslim Brother-
hood–which is where Hamas, which rules 
the Gaza Strip, originated–will be political-
ly upgraded. Whilst it should not be as-
sumed that a new political leadership in 
Cairo will terminate the peace treaty with 
Israel, it is currently difficult to predict 
how the political situation in Egypt and in 
other countries in the region will develop. 
It cannot be ruled out that some of these 
countries will be destabilized. As far as 
Israel is concerned, a new phase of inse-
curity has begun. Even though for the Pal-
estinians – they hope for a broad interna-
tional recognition in September when Pal-
estinian President Mahmood Abbas intents 
to declare an independent Palestinian 
state at the UN General Assembly. Now 
the Palestinian Authority fears loss of in-
ternational attention to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. For this reason it was 
a good idea that Catherine Ashton, the 
High Representative, also decided to visit 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories on her trip to the Middle East in the 
middle of February 2011. Shortly before, 
at the Munich Security Conference, she 
had coordinated her approach with her 
Middle East Quartet colleagues from the 
US, Russia, the EU and the UN, and em-
phasized the link between what is happen-
ing in North Africa and the Middle East 
conflict. In the Quartet the EU should now 
make another determined attempt to en-
courage Israel and the Palestinians to sign 
a peace treaty. For this purpose the Quar-
tet should meet monthly in Jerusalem. 
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